Malware Reversing Part 1

MD5 Hash  : 1d8ea40a41988b9c3db9eff5fce3abe5

This  is First Part of   2 Part Series .This Malware Drops A File (All  malwares do it usually)..So in This Part We will only Analyze Dropper and Next Part We will Analyze Dropped File.

Originally  Sample is  Downloaded  from ..It is very Good Place   for Malware Samples and Reverse Engineering .I  Uploaded the Sample to sendspace ..The Password to File is “infected”


Anyway Start With Basic Stuff..Check it  with ExeInfo/Protection ID for  Packer Detection or Compiler Detection .

NOTE: I  Have Dedicated Virtual Machine For Malware Analysis .I recommend You to have same..

Here are Results From ExeInfo/Protection ID

So  Sample is  Not Packed .:D (Normally Malwares Are packed )

Compiler Detected : Visual C++ 2008

Fine Till Now

Visual C++ Targets are Kind of Ideal For Reversing ..Unlike Delphi Targets That Contain annoying Calls..VC++ Targets are Relatively Easier to Reverse .

Debugger /Disassembler  we are going to use are



I  have a habit of Running Both IDA and Ollydbg  parallely .IDA is very Powerful Due to Its Features Like  Renaming  the Variables, Functions ,Locations and  Cross Reference etc ..Ollydbg is my Personal Favorite Debugger.

Also This Article is mainly to demonstrate Reverse Code Engineering ..I will try to Reverse Engineer Important parts of Malware .

Trace into Ollydbg Till WinMain  = 00401648 or Use IDA ..IDA By default Start From  WinMain

So lets start  Analyzing from WinMain

00401648  /$  8BFF           MOV EDI,EDI                              //Do Nthing

0040164A  |.  55               PUSH EBP                                   //Standard Function Start –Save  Frame Pointer

0040164B  |.  8BEC          MOV EBP,ESP                           //Move Stack Pointer to  EBP

0040164D  |.  83EC 1C     SUB ESP,1C                           //Allocate 1C (28) Bytes For Local Variables

00401650  |.  56               PUSH ESI                               //Save Registers Before Calling

00401651  |.  57               PUSH EDI                                

00401652  |.  E8 120D0000   CALL sample.00402369     

Lets Trace Into This Call.. Disassembly Inside Call Looks Like  This

Lets Start From Something Interesting.. We have  A   Call To API   “GetModuleHandleW” ,the argument passed  is 0 .

We All  Know  GetModuleHandleW(NULL)..Returns  Imagebase of Currently Loaded Executable  in EAX ..So  This Call returns the Imagebase of sample.exe ..Next few Lines are  Interesting

0040237A  |.  8BF0                        MOV ESI,EAX                                            //Now ESI Contain  Imagebase

0040237C  |.  8B46 3C                 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+3C]   //Get  NT HEADER OFFSET

0040237F  |.  8B9C30 800000   MOV EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+ESI+80]     //Image_import_Directory                

00402386  |.  03DE                      ADD EBX,ESI                            //Address Of _IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR Structure

00402388  |.  8B43 0C                MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+C]   //Point to  Name Field of _IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR

To Understand Above Code ..You Need Some Basic Understanding  of PE Format …

First  Here We Have  = Imagebase+3c

In PE Format First We have   IMAGE_DOS_HEADER …..Lets Explore IMAGE_DOS_HEADER in  Windbg

Ignore Other Fields.. Here  we have e_lfanew at offset 0x3C.

e_lfanew Actually Contains  the offset to  PE Header


So above instruction is to get  NT Header Offset

Imagebase is added as we are parsing the File in Memory  ..Hope it is Clear Now


So What We have is  Load value at      Imagebase+NT_HEADER+0x80  into EBX ..

Each PE File Contains   Array of   IMAGE_DATA_ DIRECTORY Structures .Lets Look Into  IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY  Structure

So Each IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY Contains Two Fields   Virtual Address and Size

NT_HEADER+80 Points to  Import_table_address .. The Values of that Directory are

00400170    D4320000    DD 000032D4          ;  Import Table address = 32D4

00400174    78000000    DD 00000078          ;  Import Table size = 78 (120.)

I  Took these values from Memory Window  of  Ollydbg ..

So what above instruction doing is getting  the import table address  ..

*Import table is very important concept ..It basically contains the info about  imported functions/Dlls

Add Imagebase  with Import Table address  as we are parsing file in memory

ADD EBX,ESI                           

Next Instruction is


This is Interesting .. Import Table is actually a Array of  IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR.. Each  IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR Structure  Contains a Info about  Single DLL and Info about Functions imported from this DLL ..SO  NO. of  IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR= No. of DLLs


    DWORD Characteristics;
    DWORD OriginalFirstThunk;
  DWORD TimeDateStamp;
  DWORD ForwarderChain;
  DWORD Name;    //offet 0xc
  DWORD FirstThunk;  //offset 0x10

So in  Above Instruction ESI is Pointing to  Name  From IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR

0040238D  |.  8975 F8       MOV [LOCAL.2],ESI                        //Save  ESI  Into Local_var

So Next  is Loop ..We Can Easily See this in  our dear Ollydbg ..Lets Look Into Loop

00402397  |> /03C6          /ADD EAX,ESI                             //Get Name of DLL In Memory

00402399  |. |68 28134000   |PUSH sample.00401328                    ; /s2 = “user32.dll”   //Constant String

0040239E  |. |50            |PUSH EAX                                ; |s1 = 000036E4 ???                /

0040239F  |. |FF15 48114000 |CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&msvcrt._stricmp>]  ; \_stricmp

004023A5  |. |85C0          |TEST EAX,EAX

004023A7  |. |59            |POP ECX                                 ;  sample.00404C78

004023A8  |. |59            |POP ECX                                 ;  sample.00404C78

004023A9  |. |0F85 A0000000 |JNZ sample.0040244F

So  what above instructions Doing are

1)Get   Address of DLL_NAME in Memory

2) Compare the DLL_NAME with “ user32.dll”

3) IF  DLL_NAME !=”user32.dll” then    Go to  NEXT  IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR   Structure

4)Go to Step 1

So this Loop Continues  Untill DLL NAME IS “user32.dll”

So lets Look What Happen  When  condition is True ..I mean DLL NAME == “user32.dll”

Jump AT 004023A9 is Conditional Jump ..That Not taken If  DLL Name ==”user32.dll”  .So lets Look Into Code  Below the conditional Jump   when we Got a Match with  DLL  Name .

004023AF  |.  8B3B          MOV EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX]    //Get Address OF   RVA of IAT in EDI

004023B1  |.  03FE          ADD EDI,ESI                                       // Get In Memory Address

004023B3  |.  8B73 10       MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+10]    // RVA of FirstThunk

004023B6  |.  0375 F8       ADD ESI,[LOCAL.2]                    //        IN Memory Address of FirstThunk

So what Above Code Does  is   Get IN Memory Address(Virtual Address of FirstThunk)..

(Look into PE format to Know More About IAT)

This Whole Procedure is Actually to   Parse the Names of APIs Imported By  DLL.

004023BE  |> /8B4D F8       MOV ECX,[LOCAL.2]                     

004023C1  |. |8D4408 02     LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+ECX+2]    //Point To Name Of API

So finally Now it Point to Name of APIs Imported By User32.dll

004023BE  |> /8B4D F8            MOV ECX,[LOCAL.2]                      ;  sample.00400000

004023C1  |. |8D4408 02       LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+ECX+2]

004023C5  |. |68 14134000    PUSH sample.00401314                   ; /s2 = “RegisterClassExW”

004023CA  |. |50                      PUSH EAX                               ; |s1 = “TranslateMessage”

004023CB  |. |FF15 48114000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&msvcrt._stricmp>] ; \_stricmp

Check If Current  API Name == RegisterClassExW (here it is not equal as First  API Imported is Translate Message ).

004023D1  |. |85C0             TEST EAX,EAX                           ;  sample.004037D2

004023D3  |. |59                  POP ECX                                ;  sample.004037D2

004023D4  |. |59                  POP ECX                                ;  sample.004037D2

004023D5  |. |75 25            JNZ SHORT sample.004023FC

If   API  Name Matched then   DO not JUMP(Execute the Code Below)  If   Not Matched then JUMP

004023D7  |. |8D45 FC        LEA EAX,[LOCAL.1]

004023DA  |. |50                 PUSH EAX                            ; /pOldProtect = sample.004037D2

004023DB  |. |6A 40          PUSH 40                                ; |NewProtect = PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE

004023DD  |. |6A 04         PUSH 4                                 ; |Size = 4

004023DF  |. |56               PUSH ESI                               ; |Address = <&USER32.TranslateMessage>

004023E0  |. |FF15 44104000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.VirtualP>; \VirtualProtect

004023E6  |. |8D45 FC       LEA EAX,[LOCAL.1]




Size=  4

HERE SIZE = 4 Bytes as Probably  it  Going to Overwrite the API Address (  As we are on 32 bit Arcitecture so Address = 4bytes=32 bits)

Address =  ESI ( API ADDRESS)   (Address  of Target API)

004023E9  |. |50                  PUSH EAX                               ; /pOldProtect = sample.004037D2

004023EA  |. |C706 EF194000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI],sample.004019EF

OverWrite the  API Address    With  004019EF (Other Function Address)

004023F0  |. |FF75 FC         PUSH [LOCAL.1]                         ; |NewProtect = PAGE_READONLY|PAGE_WRITECOPY

004023F3  |. |6A 04            PUSH 4                                 ; |Size = 4

004023F5  |. |56                  PUSH ESI                               ; |Address = <&USER32.TranslateMessage>

004023F6  |. |FF15 44104000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.VirtualP>; \VirtualProtect

Restore the  Original Permission Using VirtualProtect

Same Is For  Next  Part Of LOOP  .. it checks API  Against “CreateWindowExW”.If Name Matched then  Use VirtualProtect to   Make that Memory portion Writable .Then Change Address and Again Restore Permission

So let me  Write A Pseudo Code To Describe what Just Happened  in This LOOP


If   stricmp(Image_Import_descriptor->Name,”user32.dll)  //Label2


        Parse  using  FirstThunk ..Get API NAMES..

       If stricmp(Current_API ,”RegisterClassExW”)        //Label1


           VirtualProtect(Address_of_API,Size(4Bytes), PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE,PoldProtec)

           //  Make it Writable

            Address_of_API= 004019EF

        VirtualProtect()   //Restore original Permissions


          Else if(Stricmp(Current API,”CreateWIndowExW”)


                VirtualProtect(Address_of_API,Size(4Bytes), PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE,PoldProtec)

               //  Make it Writable

                  Address_of_API= 00402228

             VirtualProtect()   //Restore orginal Permissions




           Get Next  API NAME 

               }     //Start From Label 1




//Start From Label 2   ..Once Two Functions are matched Loop Terminates

SO After End OF LOOP  We have



Finally Functions Ends and Return …So  main Motive is this Function to Make Some Modification in IAT

After  Call ..There are some  Calls  to Resources..More Likely   Fake Calls ..As Called Resource  does not Exist

00401657  |.  8B7D 08       MOV EDI,[ARG.1]                                   // Move ImageBase Into EDI

0040165A  |.  8B35 C8104000 MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[<&USER32.LoadStringW>]      ;  USER32.LoadStringW

00401660  |.  6A 64         PUSH 64                                                                  ; /Count = 64 (100.)

00401662  |.  68 C04A4000   PUSH sample.00404AC0                              ; |Buffer = sample.00404AC0

00401667  |.  6A 67         PUSH 67                                           ; |RsrcID = 67 (103.)                //It Actually Never Exist

00401669  |.  57            PUSH EDI                                          ; |hInst = 00400000

0040166A  |.  FFD6          CALL ESI                                          ; \LoadStringW

This  ResourceID   does not Exist .Check the GetLastError  Field Under the ollydbg ERROR_RESOURCE_TYPE_NOT_FOUND.So Look Like A Fake Call   to make Program Look Legitmate(may be)

00401678  |.  57            PUSH EDI                                   ; Arg1 = 00400000        // ImageBase As Parameter

00401679  |.  E8 4DFFFFFF   CALL sample.004015CB    

Trace Into This Call… Again Few Call to  Resources ….LoadIcon,LoadResouce ..Nthing Important

After that We See a call

00401637  |.  50            PUSH EAX                                          ; pWndClassEx = 0006FECC

00401638  |.  FF15 00114000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&USER32.RegisterClassExW>]    ;\RegisterClassExW

Remember  the Address of RegisterClassExW is altered in starting ..Now Instead of Going to user32.dll  ,it points to another function  inside the executable..Trace Into this Function

Here In  this Function We can See Some Interesting Calls  Such As

GetModuleFileNameA=>Here it is  to get the  full path of Currently Executing File (As GetModuleHandleW  with Argument NULL is used to Get Handle For It)

GetTempPathW=> As Name Suggests   Retrieves a  Path  to Temp Files

Then We can see a Call to Function  00401952 =>

I  Checked this Function ..This  internally Calls CRT function _vsnwprintf…Which is used  For String Manipulation (String Formatting)..

First Call  to this Function Returns  =TMP1CDFDEBF (It is Directory name..i know it as I analyzed it )

Second Call To This Function  Returns a String = C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\\\TMP1CDFDEBF

This LookLike A Location To Drop A File

 00401A7D  |.  6A 00         PUSH 0                                                ; /pSecurity = NULL

00401A7F  |.  8D85 F4FDFFFF LEA EAX,[LOCAL.131]                                   ; |

00401A85  |.  50            PUSH EAX                                              ; |Path = “C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\\\TMP1CDFDEBF”

00401A86  |.  FF15 08104000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.CreateDirectoryW>]    

So  Here it Creates A Directory ..Nthing to Explain..

Then Again  it Call to 401952(String Formatting) to Generate File  Path ..output is


So finally this is Path to Drop File

As Shown in Pic ..then Finally there is call to CopyFileW ..So finally it Drops File to  Location Mentioned above..It Actually Copy/Drop the Same File That is  being Executed ..

So After Dropping A File Our Function Ends ..

So Till Now We Analyzed the RegisterClassExW_0 Function   … Now Trace Into  CreateWindowEx_MOD(Modified CreateWindowEx)…I Call this Function  CreateWindowEx_MOD as it internally Calles  Modified CreateWIndowExW API..

Lets Trace Into This

All  Parameters Original/Necessary  are passed to CreateWindowEx  to make it Look genuine ..Now  Step Into  CreateWindowExW

So   inside CreateWindowExW(that actually is Function  00402228)..We can See some Intersting API Calls

Such As  CreateProcessW,GetThreadContext,SetThreadContext, ,WriteProcessMemory…Lets Check what They Exactly Doing ..

Then  we have a call to   CreateProcessW(W  in the end is to indicate  a Unicode Version)… CreateProcessW  in simple words  used to Create a Process …check MSDN For Other info

Lets Check  the  Paramters Passed to CreateProcessW

Lets Check  the  Paramters Passed to CreateProcessW

00402266  |.  50            PUSH EAX                                              ; /pProcessInfo = 0006FB90

00402267  |.  8D85 D8FCFFFF LEA EAX,[LOCAL.202]                                   ; |

0040226D  |.  50            PUSH EAX                                              ; |pStartupInfo = 0006FB90

0040226E  |.  56            PUSH ESI                                              ; |CurrentDir = NULL

0040226F  |.  56            PUSH ESI                                              ; |pEnvironment = NULL

00402270  |.  6A 04         PUSH 4                                                ; |CreationFlags = CREATE_SUSPENDED 

00402272  |.  56            PUSH ESI                                              ; |InheritHandles = FALSE

00402273  |.  56            PUSH ESI                                              ; |pThreadSecurity = NULL

00402274  |.  56            PUSH ESI                                              ; |pProcessSecurity = NULL

00402275  |.  56            PUSH ESI                                              ; |CommandLine = NULL

00402276  |.  68 80464000   PUSH sample.00404680                                  ; |ModuleFileName = “C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\\\TMP1CDFDEBF\\sample.exe”

0040227B  |.  FF15 40104000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.CreateProcessW>]        ; \CreateProcessW

The Paramters Highlighted in Red Color are  Important …Let me explain it

00402270  |.  6A 04         PUSH 4                                                ; |CreationFlags = CREATE_SUSPENDED 

Acc.  To MSDN



The primary thread of the new process is created in a suspended state, and does not run until the ResumeThread function is called.

Hope it is  Clear Now….In Case of Malware if Process  is created in SUSPENDED mode then it Most probably  means it will be modified

Other interesting Paramter is

00402276  |.  68 80464000   PUSH sample.00404680                                  ; |ModuleFileName = “C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\\\TMP1CDFDEBF\\sample.exe”

So this mean our sample file starts the dropped file into SUSPENDED Mode …

*Also u can think like that …what is meaning of  dropping  Duplicate/Same File and then Run it ..Does not  making sense ..Dropping File and then run it ..then again  the file will do same (Off course u can think  that file can check its running location and can change its behavior acc. To it but it is not in this case..)…So  it will be  kind of very Stupid malware that Just Drops itself and do nthing ..:P.. so this Philosophy also provide some hint that there will be some modification  in the Dropped File Process..Also We can See Some APIs Like WriteProcessMemory

WriteProcessMemory is  basically used  for InterProcess Communication …to Write the Given Data  in Desired Location in Remote Process.

So All this make Sense that Our   malware will make Some Modification in its child Process i.e Dropped File Process .Lets Continue Analyzing

00402287  |.  50            PUSH EAX                                              ; /pContext = 0006FBE8

00402288  |.  FFB5 24FDFFFF PUSH [LOCAL.183]                                      ; |hThread = 00000048 (window)

0040228E  |.  C785 30FDFFFF>MOV [LOCAL.180],10007                                 ; |

00402298  |.  FF15 74104000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.GetThreadContext>]      ; \GetThreadContext

GetThreadContext = Retrieves the context of the specified thread  (Simple and smart Defination from MSDN)

pContext = Holds the   CONEXT Structre..I.e it Value Of registers obtained ..Here it is 006FBE8

hThread =Handle of thread….Here in this Case it  Contains the Handle of main thread of Dropped File Process(I will call it Dropped Process  )

Check Context Structre in Windbg ..WIndbg is Pretty Handy Tool to Examine  the Data Structres  in Windows ..also Shows Offsets   …that’s Really Useful…

As You can See  EAX is  at offset 0xB0 ..

We have Context  Structre Starting at    006FBE8

Context.EAX in Memory  = 006FBE8+B0=006FC98

Why EAX is So Important  …  in Case of SUSPENDED Process EAX Always Point  To Entry Point

After Executing GetThreadContext

We  Have   Value of  Context.Eax

We have  006Fc98 = 004029B9 ..As Described Earlier it is Entry Point of Dropped Process

Now Examine  Next  Few  Intersting  Lines

004022A4  |.  50            PUSH EAX                                              ; /pContext = 0006FBE8

004022A5  |.  FFB5 24FDFFFF PUSH [LOCAL.183]            ; |hThread = 00000048 (window) //Dropped  Process thread

004022AB  |.  C785 E0FDFFFF>MOV [LOCAL.136],sample.00401E1F                      //OverWrite EAX

004022B5  |.  FF15 70104000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.SetThreadContext>]     

SetThreadContext= Sets the context for the specified thread….

As You Can See   it Points to Same    Address  0006FBE8

Check the Highlighted… Here LOCAL.136 = 006Fc98 ..So what this instruction doing is  Overwriting the value at  Location 006Fc98  with   00401E1F..

And   Then  We have a call to SetThreadContext…

So     all this to change the Entry Point of Dropped Process By  Overwriting the Eax in Context Structre.

Check the Below  Snapshot    to get things more Clear way …IDA’s  naming feature  make this tool ideal for reversing .

So  Entry Point is Changed …Lets see what happened Next..Lets Analyze what happen Next

004022C1  |.  56            PUSH ESI                                          ; /pBytesWritten = NULL

004022C2  |.  68 08020000   PUSH 208                                          ; |BytesToWrite = 208 (520.)

004022C7  |.  B8 A0484000   MOV EAX,sample.004048A0                           ; |UNICODE “C:\\Documents and Settings\\Administrator\\Desktop\\97c5080399e5df2407d6fdf28faf17f8\\1d8ea40a41988b9c3db

004022CC  |.  50            PUSH EAX                                          ; |Buffer = sample.004048A0

004022CD  |.  50            PUSH EAX                                          ; |Address = 4048A0

004022CE  |.  FFB5 20FDFFFF PUSH [LOCAL.184]                 |hProcess = 00000044      //Handle of  Dropped Process

004022D4  |.  FFD3          CALL EBX                                          ; \WriteProcessMemory

As I commented  hProcess  is Handle of Dropped Process…So what  WriteProcessMemory Here Doing is  Copying  the   Orginal Path of Sample  To Dropped Process.(4048A0 contains path of Current Executable).You will come   to  know why  this is copied to dropped process

Call  to GetCurrentProcessId  = This  Returns  the Process ID of Current Process in Eax

Next , OpenProcess API is called and ProcessID of Current  Process is Passed a Parameter..This Means OpenProcess Attempt to  Currently Executing Process with PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS (Red mark 1F0FFF=PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS)…If Evrything Fine then OpenProcess Will Return A handle to  Local Process Object.

Next We Have a Call to DuplicateHanlde…This is Best Explained  in MSDN ..Read it

Then  we  have a call to WriteProcessMemory…In this  call..we are Passing the Real Handle Obtained  By Using DuplicateHandle to Dropped Process.. We Write The Handle at =404AA8  (Keep this in Mind)

If u read the MSDN  ..then the Purpose of this WriteProcessMemory will be Clear  to You ..

Then We have a call to  Resume Thread

0040231A  |.  FFB5 24FDFFFF PUSH [LOCAL.183]                    ; /hThread = 00000048   //Dropped Process

00402320  |.  FF15 1C104000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.ResumeThread>]

So  Finally  After making all the Necessary Changes  in Dropped Process …It Resumes The  Dropped Process and then Dropped Process Start Executing  ..

I  did not execute ResumeThread  Till Now …All I want is  to attach Ollydbg to  to dropped process..

Here is a way how to do it ..

We have  entry point  of   Dropped Process =401E1F h

So what we are Going to do is  to trap the    the   Dropped Process in Infinite Loop…

I am going to Use PUPE  Suite  .. And  Chaned First Two Bytes at  401E1F  to EB FE  (Write Down Orginal Bytes Before Changing Orginal Ones)

Check  my previous post  where i use same method    if  you are not getting it

 So Now Execute ResumeThread.Now  Dropped Process is Trapped in  Infinite Loop..Attach Ollydbg to it ..Replace EB FE  with Orginal Bytes (orginal Bytes : 8B FF)..

*I  Recommend to DUMP the Process  at this point as I include all the changes made by parent process..we are going to analyze this dumped  process in next part of this series

So Finally What we have is  Two Instances of Ollydbg   one  Debugging  sample and other Debugging  Dropped Process.

This is What We have in Sample Process…After Resuming  Main Thread of Dropped Process …it closes   Hanldes and Finally Exits

Look at Code From Dropped Process

So What We have Calls To Memset ..After Memset Calls We have Very Intersting  API Call

WaitForSingleObject (hObject,TimeOut)

hObject=404AA8 (Remember 2nd WriteProcessMemory Call ,Where we  Write the handle obtained from DuplicateHandle    at  404AA8  of Dropped Process)

TimeOut = INFINITE  // Wait Until  Object is Signaled

And After that   Handle is Closed  by Using CloseHandle

Then We Have  a Call to  DeleteFileW …The Filename passed is Location of   Sample Process

*Remember  when we passed the location/path of sample  Executable using first WriteProcessMemory Call

So I think Now it is clear how this   implement Self Delete(Melt Feature)/Drop File …

Dropped Process Wait for the  Event From  Sample Process …When it is Signaled it go ahead and delete that file.

So  First Part Ends Here …In Next Part We Will Analyze the Dropped Process(I Dumped it when I restore the orginal Bytes  after attaching Ollydbg to it).

I  Love to  get Your Feedback .You can Email me or    Comment on  my blog

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Posted on May 1, 2012, in Malware, Reversing. Bookmark the permalink. 2 Comments.

  1. nice tutorial gj

  2. I cannot download malware example. Would you re-upload it again?

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